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THE DUTY OF AN INSURER TO ACT PROMPTLY
ON APPLICATIONS
The makihg of a corntract of insurance is not always a simple
matter. In many instances, of course, the person seeking insur-
ance is dealing face to face with an authorized agent of the insur-
ance company, who has power to bind his principal by issuing to
the applicant a policy properly countersigned by him. In many
other ifistances, however, especially in the field of life insurance,
the zipptitant has personal dealings with an agent of the company
who is authorized only to solicit applications, and to transmit
them to some suiperior agent, or to the home office of his princi-
pal. This type of instiraitie agent has no power to bind the com-
pany to contkacts of insurance.1 He can not accept or reject
applications. He is merely a conduit, through which the applica-
tion, in the eyes of the law an offer on the part of the applicant to
enter into a contract of insurance with the company, must pass,
on its journey to the person or persons in whom is vested the
power to decide what contracts the insurance company shall make.
Before this decision is made, certain other steps are sometimes
necessary. For example, the applicant for a policy of life insur-
.ance is usually required to undergo a physical examination, a re-
port of which is forwarded to the home office along with the ap-
plication itself, and is there carefully considered.
In the ordinary course of events, the machinery which car-
ries the application to the company, and the subsequently issued
policy back to the applicant, functions properly. But there are
occasions when it does not do so. It has happened not infre-
quently that carelessness somewhere along the road has caused
delay in the issuing and delivery of the policy, and that the con-
tingency which the applicant sought to insure against has oc-
curred after the time when the policy normally would have been
issued. The applicant, in such a situation, has very naturally felt
himself aggrieved by the conduct of the insurance company. If
the latter had acted promptly, the applicant would probably have
1 RIcHAns, INSURANcE LAW (3d ed., I909) § I65.
(207)
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been reimbursed for his loss: for had it accepted the application,
it would have been liable to him on the policy of insurance; while
had it rejected the proposal, the applicant might well have
procured protection elsewhere. The applicant, therefore, has, in
a number of instances, sought to subject the insurance company
to some form of legal liability. The treatment which courts have
accorded to the disappointed applicant has been somewhat varied,
but in recent years the tendency has been to allow him to recover
from the company damages for the latter's failure to accept or
reject promptly his application. This has caused an outcry on the
part of at least one writer, who maintains that the modern cases
are ill-considered, "newfangled," and unjust.2 An examination
of the decisions dealing with the problem shows that the second
criticism, at least, is unmerited; that for a hundred years the dis-
appointed applicant has been maintaining actions against the in-
surance company; that his right to recover has always been argu-
able; and that he has at all times had the sympathy of the courts.
During the last fifteen years his litigation has been on the whole
most successful, but even before that time, he won sporadic vic-
tories.
In the beginning, the applicant sued the insurance company
in an action of contract. This proved to be not a very happy
remedy. In a few cases the applicant was allowed to recover, on
the ground that the agent of the defendant was authorized to
make, and did make, a binding contract of insurance, reserving
to his principal, however, a power to repudiate the agreement if,
before any loss occurred, it should decide that the risk was an un-
desirable one.3 Inasmuch as this power had not been exercised by
the defendant at the time when the contingency insured against
had happened, the defendant was liable on the contract. Some of
these decisions are open to serious question, because it is by no
means clear that the agent had authority to make such a contract,
' James C. Jones, Tort or No Tort, 56 Cm. LEG. N. 366 (1924).
'Insurance Co. v. Webster, 6 Wall. 129 (U. S., 1867); Continental Ins.
Co. v. Haines, io Ky. L. R. 276 (1888); Halle v. New York Life Ins. Co., 22
Ky. L. R. 740 (19oo); Perkins v. Washington Ins. Co., 4 Cow. 645 (N. Y.,
1825); Palm, Adm'r. v. Medina County. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 2o Ohio, 529
(i850.
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or that he actually did make it.4 Such an agreement has been
implied from the practice of the company in giving to policies
when they were issued the date borne by the application, even in
the face of the provision "and it is understood and agreed that
the insurance hereby applied for shall not be binding until so ap-
proved." However, in a number of other decisions, the com-
pany had followed a similar practice, yet the courts refused to
hold that any preliminary agreement existed.6 This custom of
giving the policy the same date as the application creates a pecu-
liar dilemma. In all the cases just cited, the appellant was paying
a premium for a certain period, i. e., from the date of the applica-
tion to the expiration of the insurance; but was receiving pro-
tection only during a shorter period, i. e., from the issuing of the
policy to the expiration of the insurance. While his application
was being considered, he was paying a premium and receiving
nothing. On the other hand, if a court implies an agreement that
the applicant has insurance until his proposal is rejected, he may
be receiving protection without payment, since if his application
is refused, the company will return his entire premium. It is be-
lieved that the parties do not intend, in the ordinary instance, to
make a preliminary contract, and that the company should not be
liable for a loss which occurs before it has approved the pro-
posal. A feeling of sympathy on the part of the court for the
plaintiff whose property had been destroyed is perhaps responsible
for the implication of an agreement which neither the agent nor
the applicant was in the least conscious of making.
In the majority of cases, however, the plaintiff maintained
his action on the theory that the long silence of the insurance com-
4 Palm, Adm'r. v. Medina County Mutual Fire Ins. Co., supra, note 3, for
example, was reversed on another point, and was criticised, in 5 Ohio, io7
(1855) ; but it was subsequently cited with approval in Kremmn v. Jefferson Fire
Ins. Co., 4o Ohio, 225 (1883).
5 Continental Insurance Co. v. Haynes, supra, note 3; and see also Trask v.
German Insurance Co., 53 Mo. App. 625 (1893).
"Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Mayes, 6ir Ala. 163 (1878) ; Pickett v. Ger-
man Fire Ins. Co., 39 Kan. 697, i8 Pac. 903 (1888) ; Northwestern Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Neafus, 145 Ky. 563, i4o S. W. io26 (1911); More v. New York
Bowery Fire Ins. Co., 13o N. Y. 537, 29 N. E. 757 (1892); Shawnee Mutual
Fire Ins. Co. v. McClure, 39 Okla. 535, 135 Pac. 1150 (1913); Connecticut
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Rudolph, 45 Tex. 454 (i876).
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pany constituted an acceptance of the offer contained in his appli-
cation, or that from the silence the law would presume an accept-
ance. The argument of the plaintiff here has not prevailed in
courts of last resort. On the contrary, there have been many
decisions,7 and many dicta,8 that silence or delay could in no in-
stance be tantamount to an acceptance, and that the court would
not indulge in any such unnatural presumption as that contended
for. A number of opinions pointed out that the normal inference
to be drawn from the failure of the company to tell the applicant
that his offer has been accepted is that for some reason the com-
pany has seen fit to question the desirability of the risk, and has
either rejected the application or is holding it for subsequent
action.' In the great majority of cases where the suit has been
7 Misselhorn v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., 30 Fed. 545 (C. C. Mo.,
1887) ; Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Mayes, supra, note 6; Stewart v. Helvetia
Swiss Fire Ins. Co., iO2 Cal. 218, 36 Pac. 410 (1894) ; Live Stock Ins. Co. v.
Stickler, 75 Ind. App. 191, II5 N. E. 691 (1916); Walker v. Farmers Ins. Co.,
51 Iowa, 679 (1879) ; Atkinson v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 71 Iowa, 340, 3z N. W.
371 (1887) ; Trask v. German Ins. Co., supra, note 5; St Paul Fire and Marine
Ins. Co. v. Kelley et al., 2 Neb. Uhoff. 720, 89 N. W. 997 (i92); Handlier v.
Knights of Columbus, Io6 Neb. 267, 183 N. W. 3o2 (1Q2i); More v. N. Y.
Bowery Fire Ins. Co., supra, note 6; Ross v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 124 N. C. 395,
32 S. E. 733 (1899) ; Home Forum Benefit Order v. Jones, 5 Okla. 598, 5o Pac.
I65 (1897) ; Dorman v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 41 Okla. 5o9, 137 Pac. 262
(1914) ; Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 23 Pa. 72 (1854) ; Royal Ins. Co. v. Beatty,
ii Pa. 6, 12 Atl. 6o7 (1888) ; Brink v. Merchants & Farmers United Mutual
Ins. Assn., 17 S. D. 235, 95 N. W. 929 (903); McLendon v. Woodmen of the
World, io6 Tenn. 695, 64 S. W. 36 (igoi) ; Northern Neck Mut. Fire Assn. v.
Turlington, 136 Va. 44, 116 S. E. 363 (1923) ; Haden v. Farmers & Merchants
Fire Assn., 8o Va. 683 (1885).
In the following cases, the defendant company was able to show that there
had been no unreasonable delay: Steinle v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 81 Fed. 489 (C.
C. A. 5th, i897) ; Winnesheik Ins. Co. v. Holzgrafe, 53 Ill. 516 (187o) ; Pickett
v. German Fire Ins. Co., supra, note 6; Harp v. Grangers Mutual Fire Ins. Co.,
49 Md. 307 (1878); Shawnee Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. McClure, supra, note 6;
Ripka v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co. of Annville, 36 Pa. Super. 517 (19o8).
. Kohen v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., 28 Fed. 705 (C. C. Mo., 1886);
Equitable Life Ass. Soc. v. McElroy, 83 Fed. 631 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897); Hei-
man v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 17 Minn. 153 (1871); Haskin v. Agri-
cultural Fire Ins. Co., 78 Va. 700 (1894).
'See especially Johnson v. Insurance Co.; Ross v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.;
Brink v. Merchants & Farmers United Mut. Ins. Asso., all supra, note 7.
In the converse situation, where the company sued the applicant on the note
which he gave for the premium, and the latter defended on the ground of failure
of consideration, in that no policy had been issued, the courts have held the de-
fense valid, and have refused to decide that the silence of the plaintiff constituted
an acceptance of the defendant's offer. Home Ins. Co. v. Swan, 34 Ga. App. 19,
128 S. E. 70 (1925) ; Van Arsdale & Osborne v. Young, 21 Okla. 151, 95 Pac.
778 (9o8).
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upon the contract, recovery has been denied the plaintiff. There
are only a few isolated decisions where he has been successful in
such an action.'0
One surprising feature which must strike anyone who
makes a careful examination of the decisions is the number of
times the plaintiff has secured a judgment in the court below. In
a laTge number of decisions cited in the preceding paragraph, the
appellate court was compelled to reverse the trial court." Why
courts of original jurisdiction should so repeatedly act in opposi-
tionl to the established weight of authority and to the ordinarily
accepted theory of the law of contract is difficult to understand.
It would seem to indicate a strong feeling on the part of judges
that in this situation the plaintiff should have relief, that the in-
surance company had been guilty of misconduct for which it
should be forced to respond in damages. Even justices of the
courts of appeal seem to share this attitude, for a number of opin-
ions which deny the plaintiff recovery, suggest that the insurance
company might be liable in some other form of action.'1
2
One case has held the company liable on a theory of estoppel, because the
company by its silence led the plaintiff's intestate to believe that his application
had been accepted. Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Dolan, 239 S. W. 236 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1g22). This was reversed, 262 S. W. 475 (Tex., 1924), because the
plaintiff had declared not on the completed agreement, but on a preliminary con-
tract which it was alleged the defendantes agent had made, and as to which there
was no evidence. See also Gonsoulin v. Equitable Life Ass. Co., 152 La. 865,
94 So. 4 (922).
Somerset County Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. May, Ex'r., 2 W. N. C. 43 (Pa.,
1875) (the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania being equally divided, affirmed the
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County) ; Preferred Ac-
cident Ins. Co. v. Stone, 61 Kan. 48, 58 Pac. 986 (1899) ; Stearns v. Merchants
Life and Casualty Co., 38 N. D. 524, 165 N. W. 568 (917). See also dictum
in Robinson v. U. S. Benevolent So., 132 Mich. 695, 94 N. W. 211 (903). And
cf. Cole-McIntyre-Norfleet Co. v. Holloway, 141 Tenn. 879, 214 S. W. 817
(I919), a case dealing with the acceptance of an order for the sale of goods.
'Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Mayes; Stewart v. Helvetia Swiss Fire
Ins. Co.; Livestock Ins. Co. v. Stickler; Walker v. Farmers Ins. Co.; Trask v.
German Ins. Co.; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Kelly et al.; More v.
New York Bowery Fire Ins. Co.; Home Forum Benefit Order v. Jones; Royal
Ins. Co. v. Beatty; Haden v. Farmers & Mechanics Fire Assn.; Winnesheik Ins.
Co. v. Holzgrafe; Shawnee Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. McClure; Ripka v. Mutual
Fire Ins. Co., all supra, note 7; Connecticut Mutual L. I. Co. v. Rudolph; North-
western Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Neafus, supra, note 6.
It was suggested many years ago that the company might be liable for the
negligence of its agents; this seems to foreshadow the doctrine of tort liability
to be discussed later. Walker v. Farmers Ins. Co.; Haden v. Farmers & Mechan-
ics Fire Assn., supra, note 7; see also Stewart v. Helvetia Swiss Fire Ins. Co.,
supra, note 7, and Perkins v. Washington Ins. Co., supra, note 3 (opinion of
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Finally a plaintiff adopted a new course. One Carter, a resi-
dent of the Hawaiian Islands, made an application to the defend-
ant for a policy of life insurance. Due to certain mistakes of the
physician who conducted the physical examination, and also to
the action of the defendant's agent, prompted by a desire to send
in a number of applications at one time, in retaining Carter's pro-
posal for an undue period, no policy had been issued at the time
when Carter was killed. Carter was a desirable risk, and had the
agent forwarded the application immediately, there is no question
that it would have been accepted. The executors of Carter
brought an action in tort against the company, and obtained a
verdict. The defendant appealed, alleging as error the failure
of the trial court to grant its request for a nonsuit, and judgment
for the plaintiff was affirmed. 13 The court held that the agent
of the defendant was under a non-contractual duty to forward
the application promptly, and that for his breach of the duty the
company was liable. It also suggested that there may have been
either an express or an implied promise to forward the proposal,
the consideration for which was the making of the application, the
submission to the physical examination, and the depositing of a
promissory note to be used in payment of the first premium if the
application should be accepted. The court admitted that the
problem before it was entirely a new one, on which it could find
no cases directly in point.' 4 It specifically refused to say whether
it would have reached the same result had the agent immediately
Colden, Sen.), where the view is expressed that the agent, if sued, would be
liable for his carelessness. The writers of these opinions must have believed that
the agent was under a legal duty to act promptly.
There are also dicta that long delay might, under some circumstances, con-
stitute an acceptance, or raise a presumption of acceptance. Winnesheik Ins. Co.
v. Holzgrafe; Atkinson v. Hawkeye Ins. Co.; Pickett v. German Fire Ins. Co.,
all supra, note 7.
The statement of Justice Brewer in Misselhorn v. Mutual Reserve Fund
Life Assn., supra, note 7, that the receipt of the application might cast on the
company a noral duty to act promptly is significant. It is not a very great
transition from a moral duty, i. e., one which an indivislual cannot be penalized
for failing to perform, but which all persons believe he should perform, to a
legal duty, for breach of which he is liable in damages.
" Carter v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., ii Hawaiian Rep. 69 (1897).
" The court cited Stewart v. Helvetia Swiss Ins. Co., Trask v. German Ins.
Co.; Walker v. Farmers Ins. Co., all supra, note 7; Perkins v. Washington Ins.
Co., supra, note 3; Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Waterman, 54 Fed. 839 (C. C. A. 6th,
1893) ; State Ins. Co. v. Jamieson, 79 Iowa, 245, 44 N. W. 371 (89o).
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forwarded the application, and the failure of the company to
issue the policy been the result of carelessness occurring in its
own home office, or of a deliberate refusal to pass upon the appli-
cation.
This decision excited no comment whatever. It is doubtful
whether more than a very few members of the bar in the United
States knew of its existence. Fifteen years elapsed before an-
other case like it arose, during which time disappointed applicants
continued their unsuccessful attempts to hold the insurance com-
pany liable in an action of contract.15 When finally a suit was
brought in tort, the Hawaiian decision was neither argued by
counsel nor cited by the court.
Boyer v. State Farmers' Mutual Hail Insurance Company 16
really marks the beginning of the doctrine that an insurance com-
pany is liable for the carelessness of its agents and servants in
forwarding the application or issuing the policy. Here an agent
held the plaintiff's application for hail insurance three days be-
fore he forwarded it, with the result that when the plaintiff's
crops were destroyed, no policy had been issued. The trial court
found the facts and gave judgment for the plaintiff, which was
affirmed on appeal by Judge Burch. His opinion is short and
fails to state the reason for the existence of the obligation to for-
ward the application. He says that "there was sufficient danger to
the plaintiff to be apprehended from delay in closing the trans-
action that a reasonably prudent business man, guided by the con-
siderations which ordinarily regulate conduct, would have acted
with diligence." He assumes that the agent himself would be
liable for his neglect, and hence deduces that the defendant, the
agent's principal, is likewise liable.
In a sense, the judge is begging the question. His assump-
tion that the agent would be liable to the plaintiff cannot be
granted without argument. The only reason suggested for im-
posing such an obligation is that a prudent business man would
have forwarded the policy. Because the agent did not live up to
' See cases cited, supra.
186 Kan. 442, 121 Pac. 329 (912).
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the ideal which existed in the mind of the court, he is held legally
liable.
No one will question that the agent acted improperly in re-
taining the application. But that alone is not a satisfactory rea-
son for holding that he has committed a tort. Many persons fail
to exercise the diligence of a prudent business man, guided by the
consideration which ordinarily regulates conduct, without render-
ing themselves liable to those who suffer because of their lack of
care. The law does not impose on persons in general a duty to
act to save others from harm. It is only in certain specific situa-
tions where a man is under affirmative obligations. It may well
be that the interests of society demand that a duty be imposed on
the agent in a case like that before the Kansas court. Certainly
the court must have felt so. But it is unfortunate that the writer
of the opinion did not state the considerations which compelled
him to create this new doctrine. The brevity with which he treats
the problem and the failure to explain adequately his reasons for
adopting the rule announced are matters of regret.
In the following year, the legislature of North Dakota passed
a statute, substantially enacting the rule of the Boyer case.17
It required any company engaged in the business of writing hail
insurance within the state to notify an applicant of the rejection
of his application within twenty-four hours of the time it was re-
ceived. If the company failed to do so, a contract of insurance
came into effect. When the validity of this statute was attacked,
the Supreme Court of North Dakota held it to be a reasonable
regulation, made in the interest of the public, which was neces-
sary to protect the economic welfare of the state's agricultural
population; and one with which it was possible for the insurance
-companies, by somewhat altering their methods of doing busi-
ness, to comply."' The Federal Supreme Court, while stating that
the wisdom of the statute was not for it to consider, likewise held
that the law did not transcend the limit of the state's power to
"Laws, N. D., 1913, c. 177, No. i; N. Dak. Comp. Laws, Ann. (1913)
§ 4902.
' Wanberg v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 46 N. D. 369, 179 N. W. 66o
(1920). Robinson, J., dissented.
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regulate insurance companies in order to promote the public wel-
fare. 19 The North Dakota statute is another manifestation of the
feeling which has been commented on before, that an insurance
company should be required to exercise care in dealing expedi-
tiously with the applications which it receives, and that where a
loss occurs against which the applicant might have been protected
had it disposed of the application with greater speed, the burden
of that loss should be upon it, rather than upon the unfortunate
individual.
In the same year, the Supreme Court of Iowa decided the
case of Duffie v. Bankers Life Association,2" which has been cited
more often than any other decision on the subject. Here the view
was adopted that the company was under a duty to act promptly
because it held a franchise from the state. This reason, of course,
is weak, since every corporation holds a franchise, charter, etc.,
yet it would never be suggested that all corporations are under
a duty to dispose promptly of all offers which they received. It
may be that the court has in mind the fact that the business of in-
surance is so affected with the public interest that the state may
regulate its conduct in many different ways. But again the an-
swer may be made that there are other businesses, which
can be just as highly supervised and regulated, but to which
no such doctrine as the one adopted has ever been applied.
In order to justify its position, the court should have demon-
strated that certain peculiar characteristics of the insur-
ance business make the imposition of such a duty essential to the
public welfare; this it failed to do. The court is also influenced
by the fact that the policy, if issued, would have been dated as
of the day the application was signed, and that therefore the de-
fendant would have received a premium for a period during
which it was running no risk. This factor does seem important;
the insurance company does occupy a strategic position, whereas
the applicant is at a distinct disadvantage. One can readily un-
derstand the desire of the court that this period of suspense
should not be prolonged unduly, and it seems probable that this
"National Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U. S. 71 (1922).
0 i6o Iowa, i, 139 N. IV. lO87 (1913).
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element was largely responsible for the decision of the court that
the insurance company must decide on the proposal within a rea-
sonable time. As far as precedent is concerned, the court relies
on the Boyer case, and on dicta found in some of the decisions
where the action was brought on the alleged contract.21
Three years later, the Supreme Court of Nebraska, by a
majority of one, adopted and applied the same rule in the case of
Wilkin v. Capital Fire Insurance Co.,22 entirely on the authority
of the Duffie case, from which it quoted at great length. Subse-
quent decisions in Nebraska have not expressly repudiated this
rule; but in two instances, recovery has been denied to the plain-
tiff on the ground that he has shown no negligence on the part of
the defendant, and the language of the court has indicated a re-
luctance to apply the doctrine of the Wilkin case.
23
The next tribunal to pass on the question was the Supreme
Court of Arkansas, which decided that a verdict for the defend-
ant should have been directed, on the ground that even if the
agent had acted promptly, the company, under the terms of the
application, would have been under no duty to issue a policy, and
might have capriciously rejected the proposal.24 This undoubt-
edly begs the question. Although it has been suggested that an
' Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Neafus, supra, note 6; Continental
Ins. Co. v. Haynes, supra, note 3; Walker v. Farmers Ins. Co., supra, note 7.
= 99 Neb. 828, 157 N. W. io2i (igi6).
2In Meyer v. Central States Life Ins. Co., io3 Neb. 640, 173 N. W. 578
(i9ig), the delay resulted because the examining physician used a faulty instru-
ment which showed that the applicant had too high a blood pressure. The court
held that there was no evidence of negligence for which the defendant was re-
sponsible-[a doubtful decision, for was not the physician the agent of the com-
pany? Cf. Dyer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 132 Wash. 378, 232 Pac. 346
(1925)] and then went on to say: "Without regard to the insufficiency of the
evidence to sustain the judgment (for the plaintiff), it is the opinion of the
writer that no cause of action exists in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant." The opinion was written by Rose, J., who had dissented in the
Wilkin case.
In Page v. National Automobile Ins. Co., iog Neb. 127, go N. W. 213
(1922), the Wilkin case was referred to by Rose, J., but he disclaimed passing on
the question of whether any duty to act promptly on the application existed. The
plaintiff's action was dismissed because of the insufficiency of the evidence to sus-
tain the judgment. In Handlier v. Knights of Columbus, supra, note 7, the plain-
tiff sued on the contract, and failed to recover.
"National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. School District No. 55, 122 Ark. 179,
182 S. W. 547 (1916). This case was cited as governing the question in Inter-
state Business Men's Accident Assn. v. Nichols, 143 Ark. 369, 220 S. W. 477
(1920).
DUTY OF INSURER TO ACT PROMPTLY ON APPLICATIONS 217
insurance company should be treated as a public servant under a
duty to furnish its service by issuing its policy to any properly
qualified applicant,25 this view has never been adopted by any
court. 26 The judges who wrote the opinions in the four cases
which adopted the rule requiring prompt action were under no
illusions on this point. None of them suggested that the defend-
ant was bound to accept the plaintiff's offer, and it is believed that
all of them would have held it was not so bound. The North
Dakota statute allowed to the insurance companies the privilege
of rejecting applications for any cause whatever, provided they
communicated their rejections to the applicants within the re-
quired time; and it is doubtful whether, if the statute had at-
tempted to impose on the insurance companies a duty similar to
that owed by carriers and other public servants, to serve all
comers, it would have been held constitutional by the Supreme
Court of the United States.2 The position taken by the
courts following the Boyer and Duffle cases has been that, while
the insurance company had an absolute privilege to accept or to
reject, it must do one or the other within a reasonable time. To
this, the argument of the Arkansas court is no answer.
That their opinion exerted no great influence on the minds
of the judiciary in other states is shown by several decisions
within the next three years, in which the plaintiff recovered. The
Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the insurance com-
pany was liable even in a suit on the contract, on the ground that
a preliminary agreement existed, whereby the contract of insur-
ance was to come into existence if the company did not reject the
application and return the deposit within a reasonable time. It
also stated that it could see no real distinction between its de-
cision, and those holding the company liable in tort for its neg-
See Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L.
REv. x98, at pp. 26, 217 (1919).
" Of course, cases where a duly authorized agent of the insurance company
has contracted that the applicant shall be insured from the moment he signs the
application, unless the company shall, for some reasonable cause, repudiate the
contract, stand on a different footing. See citations, supra.
' Cf. Opinion of Chief Justice Taft in National Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
Wanberg, supra, note xg.
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ligence.28 Iowa reaffirmed the position which it had adopted in
the Duffle case.2 9 Idaho, in which the question arose for the first
time, held that both the company and the agent to whom the ap-
plication was made were liable in tort where, because of the care-
lessness of the latter, no policy was issued.30  In this case the rea-
soning of the court is peculiar. It is found as a fact that the agent
made a valid preliminary agreement to issue a policy of insurance
to the plaintiff. The latter, therefore, had a right of action on
this contract against the insurance company, but had none against
the agent. 31 The suit, however, was brought, not in contract, but
in tort, for the negligence of the agent in failing to issue the pol-
icy, and both the company and the agent were named defendants.
The court held that the conduct of the agent was a tort, a viola-
tion of a duty which arose because of the preliminary agreement,
and that both parties defendant were liable. The question of
whether a duty would exist in the absence of any preliminary
agreement is left unanswered, although the Court cited the Boyer
and Duffie cases with apparent approval. Yet this is really the
chief issue involved. If such. a common-law 32 duty to act on the
plaintiff's request for insurance did exist, then the decision of the
Court is clearly correct; but if it did not, then it would seem that
the only damage which the plaintiff suffered arose purely out of
the breach of the preliminary agreement; that therefore the plain-
tiff should be required to sue in contract; and should not have re-
covery against both the principal and the agent.
The Chief Justice, in a concurring opinion, relied on the anal-
ogy of those cases which hold that a broker is liable if he is in-
structed to procure insurance for a customer and fails to do so.33
Stearns v. Merchants Life and Casualty Co., 38 N. D. 524, 165 N. W. 568
(1917).
"Johnson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 184 Iowa, 63o, 168 N. W. 264 (1918).
"0 Wallace v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. and Stickfadden, 31 Idaho, 481, 174
Pac. ioo9 (1918).
" It is submitted that the agent, when he agreed to issue the policy, was
acting only in a representative capacity, and did not intend to bind himself. See
McCabe v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 N. D. i9, 81 N. W. 426 (1899). Therefore, he
would not be liable to the plaintiff for his principal's failure to perform the
contract. MECHEMi, AGENCY (2d ed., 1914) § 1357.
2 I. e., a duty arising out of neither statute nor contract.
33 18 A. L. R. 1214 (1922).
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But a broker who is told to procure insurance is thereby made,
for the time being, the agent of the customer, to whom he owes
a duty to carry out properly his instructions. A representative of
an ipsprance company to whom an application is made, is not the
agent of the applicant, but of the company. Whether or not he
owes the former a duty to act promptly on the application depends
on just the same considerations as whether the company owes any
duty to act on the proposal within a reasonable time. Each duty
may exist; certain of the cases already considered so hold; but
one canuot be inferred by assuming the other. The Chief Justice,
when he says that the agent is liable, and that hence the company
is also liable, uses as a premise that which it is necessary to prove.
Only on the theory that, irrespective of any contract, the agent
and the company each owed the plaintiff a duty to issue him a
policy or to decline the risk with reasonable speed, can the judg-
ment against both defendants be justified.
The rule of the Duffle case was subjected to a flank attack
by the courts of Illinois. In Bradley v. Federal Life Insurance
Company,3 4 an administrator brought an action against the de-
fendant, whose agent had failed to forward an application for
accident insurance made by Fraley, his intestate, with the result
that when Fraley, an insurable risk, was killed he was not pro-
tected by the policy which, in the normal course of events, would
have been issued to him. Neither the Appellate Court nor the
Supreme Court passed on the question of whether any duty was
owed to the applicant by the company. The former held that
whatever right of action the intestate may have had could not
pass to his administrator under the laws of Illinois, since it was
neither an action to recover damages for an injury to the person
or an action to recover damages for an injury to real or personal
property. The Supreme Court based its opinion on slightly dif-
ferent grounds, that since the plaintiff's intestate was killed in-
stantaneously, no right of action ever accrued to him, and hence
there was no right of action to survive. No separate right of
action could accrue to the plaintiff.
"tBradley v. Federal Life Insurance Co., 295 Ill. 381, 127 N. E. i9i (i92o),
affirming 216 Ill. App. 6o2 (ig2o).
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The case raises some interesting problems. The reasoning
of the Supreme Court seems particularly open to question. The
fact that Fraley was killed instantaneously would seem to be of
little importance. If any duty existed, a thing which the court
did not decide, it had been breached before the accident. Fraley
should have been allowed to recover nominal damages, if he had
sued. The happening of the accident merely increased the quan-
tum of the damages which he, or his administrator, could re-
cover. It is true that no right of action against the insurer
sprang into existence after his death. 5 But the plaintiff was not
trying to enforce such a right; the plaintiff was seeking to main-
tain the right which Fraley had acquired in his own lifetime.
This seems to be the attitude of the Appellate Court. Its
decision follows logically from a strict interpretation of the
statute providing for the survival of tort actions.86 Nevertheless,
if the court had felt that a duty clearly should be imposed upon
the defendant for reasons of social policy, it would not have stulti-
fied itself by holding that the right to recover damages for breach
of the duty did not pass to the administrator. In the Duffie case,
where the plaintiff was likewise the personal representative of the
applicant, the court did not have to treat this phase of the prob-
lem, since the right of action clearly survived under the Iowa
statute.37  Several of the other cases have also passed over the
question in silence.38  In others where it has been raised, the
"The failure to forward the application was not the cause of the death.
In any case, there was no statute under which a right of action would accrue to
the administrator.
36 See Ill. Rev. Stat. (Cahill, 1925), c. 3, § 125:
"In addition to the actions which survive by the common law, the fol-
lowing shall also survive: Actions of replevin, actions to recover damages
for an injury to the person (except slander and libel), actions to recover
damages for an injury to real or personal property, or for the detention or
conversion of personal property, and actions against officers for misfeasance,
malfeasance or nonfeasance, of themselves or their deputies, and all actions
for fraud or deceit."
At common law an action of tort did not survive the death of the sole plain-
tiff. I R. C. L. 29; SCHOULER on WILLs, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (6th
ed., 1923), § 2188.
'Iowa, Code (19-4), § 10957.
"Cf. Carter v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., supra, note 13; Wallace v. Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co., supra, note 3o; Fox, Admr., v. Volunteer State Life Ins.
Co., i85 N. C. 121, 126 S. E. 226 (1923). In all these jurisdictions, statutes
provide that the right of action shall not abate, if the cause of action survive.
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court has disposed of it by holding that the action, though sound-
ing in tort, is really based on a breach of duty arising out of an
implied contract to decide promptly whether the application will
be accepted,89 and hence would survive under the common law.
Whether the parties do make such an agreement is doubtful.
These courts seem to have in mind a duty quasi-contractual in
character; that is, a duty which the defendant has not consciously
promised to assume, but one to which the courts will nevertheless
hold him because they believe that to do so promotes justice and
the best interests of society. In substance, it makes no difference
whether the court calls the duty one of tort or of quasi-contract;
in form, the adoption of the latter label may make it easier to de-
cide that the applicant's right of action passes to his personal rep-
resentative. It is most important, however, that a tribunal be
clear as to whether the obligation is one which the company has
voluntarily undertaken, or one which is imposed on it by the law,
regardless of its consent. If it is the former, the company can
easily escape by inserting a stipulation in the application that no
such duty is assumed; if it is the latter, the company's ability to
do so is less clear.
Since the Bradley case, decisions in Oklahoma, 40 North
Carolina,4 ' Colorado, 42 Washington,4 3 and North Dakota,4 4 have
See Haw. Rev. Laws (1915), § 2626; Idaho, Comp. Stat. (1919), § 6652; N.
C. Cons. Stat. (I919), § 461. There are similar provisions in North Dakota,
Comp. Laws, Ann. (1913), § 74o8; Okla., Rev. Laws (1921), § 223; and Wash-
ington, Pierce's Code, § 8274. This form of statute leaves open the question
of whether the cause of action does survive to the personal representative. In
Colorado, however, the statute expressly provides for survival. See Colo. Comp.
Laws (1921), § 5383.
'Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okla. 228, 222 Pac. 255
(1923) ; Dyer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., supra, note 23.
" Security Ins. Co. v. Cameron, 85 Okla. 171, 205 Pac. 151 (1922) ; Colum-
bian National Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, supra, note 39.
'Fox, Adm'r., v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., supra, note 38. Here the
agent carelessly failed to deliver the policy which had been issued and sent to
him by the home office. The court reversed a judgment of nonsuit. It is not
especially clear whether the court believed that the duty to deliver promptly was
one imposed by law, or one arising out of an implied contract between the par-
ties.
t DeFord, Adm'r, v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. IO49
(194).
" Dyer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., supra, note 23.
"A lower court case, for the statement of which see In re Coughlin's Es-
tate, 2o5 N. W. 14 (N. D., 1925). The administratrix sued in tort,
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ield that a duty to act promptly existed.45  The opinions in these
cases have not added greatly to the reasoning in support of the
rule, for they have relied largely on the earlier authorities. But
their number, coupled with the fact that there have been no de-
cisions denying the existence of the duty, firmly establishes the
doctrine of Boyer v. State Farmers Mutual Hail Insurance Co.
and of Duffie v. Bankers Life Insurance Co. in the insurance law
of this country.
Considering the problem purely on its merits, it is submitted
that the rule announced by those cases is a desirable one. Insur-
ance has come to play such an extensive part in our civilization
that the business is recognized as being quasi-public in character;
and the insurance contract is treated by the courts in a way dif-
ferent from ordinary agreements. More and more the tendency
seems to be to shift wherever possible the burden of loss due to
accident or catastrophe from the shoulders of the individual to
those of the community or of a group within the community.
While this policy is usually effected by legislation,40 the courts
have also been ready to further it in their treatment of the rules
of the common law." In the particular situation which has been
considered, where carelessness on the part of the insurer has re-
sulted in the unfortunate applicant being left unprotected by the
insurance which, but for that carelessness, he would have ob-
tained; it is rather natural for the courts to hold that the burden
of the loss which the applicant suffered must be assumed by the
insurer, i. e., the group.
It must be remembered that the insurer is usually receiving a
premium during the timewhen it is holding the application in abey-
and secured a verdict and judgment. No appeal was taken. Later the defend-
ant moved for judgment n. o. v. or for a new trial. This motion was denied be-
cause made too late. On appeal the order denying the motion was affirmed.
Coughlin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 49 N. D. 948, 194 N. W. 661 (1923).
45 The Supreme Court of Wyoming sustained a verdict directed for the de-
fendant on the ground of the insufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence, but refused
to pass on the questions of whether any duty existed and whether the cause of
action would survive. Dunne v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 246 Pac. 246
(Wyo., 1926).
"'For example, by workmen's compensation statutes.
' In the many decisions favoring the insured, courts have undoubtedly been
influenced by a desire to spread the loss.
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ance. Furthermore, it is seldom subjected to greater liability than
it would have incurred had it functioned properly and accepted the
proposal. 48  To allow it to benefit as the result of its carelessness,
which has so greatly harmed the applicant, seems offensive to all
theories of justice. That this attitude will not be shared by all
persons who will confront the problem is readily admitted; and
the desirability of imposing on the insurer the duty to act
promptly will never be demonstrated with mathematical exacti-
tuide. It is believed, however, that when the question is presented
before the appellate tribunals of the various states of this country
which have not yet considered it, the majority of them will be
sufficiently influenced by the considerations which have been men-
tioned to decide that the insurer must be responsible for the loss
which the applicant incurred.
On what ground will they rest their decisions? Probably
none will take the position that the company is liable on
the completed contract of insurance, in that the silence of the in-
surer constituted an acceptance of the offer in the application.
While there may be situations when silence is an acceptance, this
is not one of them.49 The authorities are too numerous for the
courts to disregard.'50 Nor should the courts resort to estoppel,
that haven of refuge of the perplexed jurist. It is doubtful
whether, under our objective theory of contract, estoppel can play
any part.51 In any case, there is no real estoppel here; as many
of the early cases pointed out, the ordinary man would not infer
from the silence of the insurer that his proposal had been ap-
proved. If he thought of the matter at all, he would surely con-
"The proper measure of damages in a tort action would be the amount of
the policy applied for, less the premium which would have been paid. This sum
is precisely what the company would have lost had it accepted the risk. Of
course, if the risk was such that not only the defendant, but any other company
would have declined it, the plaintiff has not been injured by the delay.
' On silence as assent to an offer, see WLLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920), § 91;
and Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations,
26 YAXm L. J. 169 (1917). The latter points out that while the offeror may, per-
haps, confer a power on the offeree to make silence operate as an acceptance, he
cannot unreasonably deprive the offeree of his pre-existing immunity in keeping
silent. See pp. 200, 201.
See citations, supra.
See 33 H~Av. L. REV. 595 (1920).
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clude that some question had been raised by the home office, and
that no policy had yet been issued to him.
The suggestion that the insurer or the agent promises to act
promptly ignores actuality. No such agreement is made ex-
pressly, nor can the intention to make one be implied. If a court
should hold that a contract to decide expeditiously on the proposal
did exist, it is believed that, within a short time, all insurance com-
panies doing business in that jurisdiction would incorporate in
their applications stipulations expressly negativing any such
promise.
The only remaining ground, then, is to hold that the in-
surer is under a duty entirely irrespective of contract, one which
the law imposes regardless of the company's desire to assume it.
Whether this duty be called one of tort or of quasi-contract is
immaterial. In either case, its fundamental feature is its non-
consensual nature. It is a duty peculiar to the business of insur-
ance, and does not extend beyond it. It is believed that the ordinary
business man will never be subjected to a similar obligation.52
One problem commands attention. Granting the existence
of the duty, to whom is it owed? When a man applies for a pol-
icy of life insurance, naming X beneficiary, who is the proper
party to sue the insurer? The decisions are unanimous in holding
that the estate of the applicant and not the named beneficiary
should recover. This may produce most unjust results. If the es-
tate is heavily indebted, the entire proceeds of the judgment may
go to the creditors and X may take nothing; whereas, if the policy
had actually been issued, X, if protected by exemption laws,
"Only two cases similar to those discussed have been found outside the field
of insurance law. In Four States Grocery Co. v. Wickendon, 217 S. W. 1103
(Tex. Civ. App., igig), the agent of the defendant, a mercantile corporation,
took an order from the plaintiff, which he failed to send in for acceptance. As
a result, the plaintiff never secured the goods, and was forced to purchase them
elsewhere at a higher price. He sued the defendant, on the contract to purchase,
and alleging that the defendant was estopped to deny the making of the contract
because of the negligence of the salesman and his reliance on the sending in of
the order. Judgment was rendered for the defendant. See comment by Charles
E. Clark, 29 YALE L. J. 673 (192o). Cf. Cole-McIntyre-Norfleet Co. v. Hollo-
way, supra, note IO, where under similar circumstances, the defendant was held
liable on the contract. See comments 29 YALE L. J. 441 (1920) ; 33 HA~v. L.
REv. 595 (1920).
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would have received the entire sum.13 Again, if X is a person
not related to the deceased, and not named as legatee in his will,
he will be entitled to nothing, and whatever is recovered will go
to swell the estate. Indeed, it is difficult to see how, in such a
situation, the estate could recover anything more than nominal
damages; true, the insui-er owed the applicant a duty, but the
breach of that duty injured neither the applicant nor his estate,
but only X. The latter should be the one to sue and recover. It
may be objected that the law will not ordinarily award damages
for itijutries to mere expectancies." But it will do so in a few
situatiors,l5 and despite the dearth of precedent, it is believed that
it should do so here. The situation is not unlike that found when
a donee berieficiary seeks to recover for breach of contract, and
the same comment is applicable: that any sensible system of law
will also allow him relief.rs
Undoubtedly, insutdncte rompanies will attempt to relieve
themselves of this duty, by stipulations in their applications to the
effect that they shall have a given number of days within which
to consider the proposal, after which time, if the applicant has
heard nothing, his offer shall be deemed rejected. It is believed
that such a term will not fully protect the insurers in any jurisdic-
tion which holds that a duty to act promptly exists. Where the
duty is imposed by statute, courts have decided that it could not
be avoided. 58 Even if the duty is non-statutory, the same result
should follow. Just as a carrier cannot by contract escape liabil-
ity for its negligence, so an insurance company should be held
" In Coughlin's Estate, supra, note 44, the wife recovered as administratrix,
and the creditors claimed the proceeds of the judgment The court decided, how-
ever, that they were exempt, under N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (913), § 8719,
providing that the avails of a life insurance policy, payable to the estate of the
deceased, should not be subject to the debts of the decedent. In many other
states, where the exemption laws are less liberal, the creditors would have suc-
ceeded.
.See 27 YALE L. J. 263 (1917) ; 28 YALE L. J. 5o7 (igig).
"Cf. Metallic Compression Casting Co. v. Fitchburg R. Co., 1o9 Mass. 277
(1872) ; Lewis v. Corbin, 195 Mass. 52o, 8z N. E. 248 (i9o7) ; Concordia Fire
Ins. Co. v. Simmons County, 167 Wis. 541, 68 N. W. igg (i918).
" Cf. Wn-ISTON, CoNcTCTs (192o), § 357.
" Cf. the clause suggested by Mr. Jones, in his article cited, supra, note 2.
" Wanberg v. Nat Union Fire Ins. Co., supra, note 18; National Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, supra, note i9.
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responsible if the carelessness of its agent leaves the applicant un-
protected. If it can be shown that within the given period, the
company could have acted but failed to do so, it has violated its
duty to the applicant, and must answer to him for whatever dam-
ages he suffers thereby. However, such a stipulation may have
one effect: after the expiration of the period it may cast on the
applicant the obligation to seek insurance elsewhere. The gist of
the tort action is the failure of the insurer to decide or to inform
the applicant of its decision, thereby preventing him from secur-
ing protection from another company. The insurer may reject his
proposal for any cause whatever. After the expiration of the
given period, therefore, it would seem that the situation was just
as if the insurer had, on the last day, informed the applicant that
it declined to accept the risk. Such a stipulation would, there-
fore, decrease the number of instances in which the insurer might
be liable, but would not relieve it of responsibility in every case.
Undoubtedly this battle between the company and the disap-
pointed applicant will be carried on in other jurisdictions. Prob-
ably each side will win some victories. But it is believed that if
a survey be made in years hence, it will be found that the insurer,
in the majority of instances, will have been required to answer
in damages for its negligent delay.
Carl W. Funk.
Philadelphia, Pa.
